Democracy in Hong Kong

Hong Kong is an SAR of China that is largely free to manage its own affairs based on “one country, two systems,” a national unification policy developed by Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s. The concept was intended to facilitate the reintegration of Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao with sovereign China while preserving their unique political and economic systems. After more than a century and a half of colonial rule, the British government returned Hong Kong in 1997. (Qing Dynasty leaders ceded Hong Kong Island to the British Crown in 1842 after China’s defeat in the First Opium War.) Portugal returned Macao in 1999, and Taiwan remains independent.

The Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984 dictated the terms under which Hong Kong was returned to China.  The declaration and Hong Kong’s Basic Law, the city’s constitutional document, safeguard the city’s “capitalist system and way of life” and grant it “a high degree of autonomy,” including executive, legislative, and independent judicial powers for fifty years (until 2047). Chinese Communist Party officials do not preside over Hong Kong as they do over mainland provinces and municipalities, but Beijing still exerts considerable influence through loyalists who dominate the region’s political sphere. Beijing also maintains the authority to interpret Hong Kong’s Basic Law.

Freedom of the press, expression, assembly, and religion are protected rights. Hong Kong is allowed to forge external relations in certain areas—including trade, communications, tourism, and culture—but Beijing maintains control over the region’s diplomacy and defense.

A metropolis of more than seven million people, Hong Kong is a global financial and shipping center that has prospered from its proximity to the world’s second-largest economy, ranking first in the world in trade as a percentage of GDP. Relatively low taxes, a highly developed financial system, light regulation, and other capitalist features make Hong Kong one of the world’s most attractive markets and set it apart from mainland financial hubs like Shanghai. Hong Kong continues to take top spots in global economic competitiveness reports, ranking fourth in the World Bank’s 2016 Doing Business report and first in the world on the Heritage Foundation’s 2016 Index of Economic Freedom. Most of the world’s major banks and multinational firms maintain regional headquarters in the city.

Hong Kong’s economic power has diminished relative to the mainland—its GDP fell from 16 percent of China’s after the handover in 1997 to just 3 percent in 2014—but commercial ties remain extremely tight. Hong Kong is China’s second-largest trading partner (after the United States), accounting for more than 8 percent of China’s total trade in 2016. The city is also China’s largest source of foreign direct investment (FDI) and a place where Chinese firms raise vast amounts of offshore capital—more than nine hundred mainland enterprises list on the Hong Kong stock exchange.

Meanwhile, Hong Kong relies heavily on the mainland. China, the top destination for Hong Kong exports, accounted for more than half of the city’s total trade in 2015. More than half of the mainland’s outward FDI stock is destined for Hong Kong, though much of this investment is later channeled overseas. Hong Kong’s seemingly growing economic dependence on the mainland market signals that any economic hiccups in China will bear repercussions in the southern economic hub.

Beijing’s reluctance to allow Hong Kong to develop into a full-fledged democracy with free and fair elections is a perennial bone of contention. Experts say a source of the problem is ambiguity in the Basic Law, which Beijing continues to reinterpret. The document states that Hong Kong’s chief executive “shall be selected by election or through consultations held locally and be appointed by the Central People’s Government,” and that “the ultimate aim is the selection of the chief executive by universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly representative nominating committee in accordance with democratic procedures.” The nature and timing of electoral reforms are unclear.

Michael F. Martin, an Asian affairs specialist for the Congressional Research Service, says when Beijing proposed universal suffrage, it used the word 可以 (keyi), which translates widely to “can,” “may,” “possible,” or “able to,” thus making it difficult to discern whether Beijing’s decisions comply with the Basic Law.

Some analysts say China’s decisions in 2004, 2007, and 2014 to put off a popular vote for Hong Kong’s leader are an indication that Beijing will drag its feet on reforms indefinitely. China’s legislature ruled in August 2014 that only candidates vetted by a nominating committee chosen by Beijing will be allowed to run in 2017. In June 2015, Hong Kong’s lawmakers rejected a bill that would have introduced “universal suffrage” of the chief executive from a selection of pre-approved candidates.

Pro-democracy factions were winners in the September 2016 elections for the city’s legislative body, the Legislative Council. Localist politicians, focused on preserving Hong Kong’s autonomy and local culture, won six seats out of the thirty-five geographic constituencies chosen by a popular vote and combined secured nearly 20 percent of the vote. Controversy erupted later in November 2016 when China’s National People’s Congress Standing Committee made a rare intervention in local court proceedings, passing a new interpretation of Hong Kong’s Basic Law provisions that require new legislators to take an oath of office. The ruling disqualified two pro-independence lawmakers who altered the language of the oath by pledging to defend a “Hong Kong nation.”

Additionally, the mysterious disappearances of a handful of Hong Kong booksellers and media executives in the fall of 2015 and the vanishing of a Chinese billionaire raise concerns about the independence of Hong Kong’s legal system and authorities. The media is believed to have been targeted by Chinese state agents for publications critical of Beijing. The alleged abduction of Xiao Jianhua, one of China’s wealthiest financiers, who has reported links to Chinese President Xi Jinping, stokes fears that Hong Kong’s autonomy is eroding further.

“What so-called Taiwan independence and so-called Hong Kong independence have in common is that they are hell-bent on destroying the country and bringing disaster to its people, under the banner of freedom and democracy.” —People’s Daily editorial

Beijing and Hong Kong have benefited economically from the 1997 handover. As reforms have been delayed, frustration has built among Hong Kongers with what they deem to be actions taken to limit the city’s independence and an erosion of the “one country, two systems” principle. Since the handover, chief executives have been selected by an election committee, first composed of four hundred, then eight hundred, and now 1,200 members from four main sectors 

[PDF] (industrial, commercial, and financial sectors; other professional sectors, including higher education and engineering; labor, social services, and religious sectors; and Hong Kong political bodies). All changes to political processes have to be approved by the Hong Kong government and the National People’s Congress, the PRC’s legislative body.

Beijing has traditionally been reluctant to change its policy when faced with criticism. Hong Kong’s 2014 protests and 2016 Legislative Council elections caught the attention of the Chinese leadership, and Beijing seems to be tightening its posture toward Hong Kong’s governance. Beijing views all protests and pro-democracy political voices as potential challenges to China’s one-party rule, but it perceives Hong Kong’s calls for democracy as particularly threatening because of the city’s status as an international economic hub. China’s leadership is concerned that an elected democratic chief executive “would seek to destabilize Communist Party rule in China,” writes Richard C. Bush, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. Beijing also fears that any political compromise could set a dangerous precedent and spark dissent in other regions, including Tibet, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, Macao, and Taiwan, Bush adds. In a January 2017 editorial in the state-run People’s Daily, China condemned separatist forces: “What so-called Taiwan independence and so-called Hong Kong independence have in common is that they are hell-bent on destroying the country and bringing disaster to its people, under the banner of freedom and democracy.”

Given the changing power dynamic between Hong Kong and the mainland and China’s global rise, experts say it is unrealistic for protesters to expect Beijing to revise its stance. “Once the PRC government starts asserting itself, it isn’t likely to stop,” writes Doug Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato Institute. With Beijing now wielding more economic power, it might be inclined to redirect business, investment, and trade elsewhere, adds Bandow. “In time [Beijing] might be prepared to sacrifice Hong Kong’s economic strength for political ends.”

Younger generations have developed political grievances because they feel they are not reaping the benefits of their city’s wealth and face stiff competition from the influx of mainlanders.

Is Hong Kong united on democratic reform?

Public opinion in Hong Kong is divided. Some call for the preservation of Hong Kong’s current system, while others push for fundamental reforms of the Basic Law. A poll conducted by the Chinese University of Hong Kong in July 2016 found that 17.4 percent of people supported or strongly supported the idea of an independent [PDF] Hong Kong after 2047, but less than 4 percent believed such an outcome would be possible.

The political system still does not adequately represent the wide array of perspectives held by the Hong Kong population. The widening generational gap and mounting economic inequality—Hong Kong has one of the world’s highest levels of income inequality—have intensified political divisions. Younger generations have developed political grievances because they feel they are not reaping the benefits of their city’s wealth and face stiff competition from the influx of mainlanders. The influence of mainland money also exacerbates the divide between socioeconomic classes. The Hong Kong government must reconcile these opposing political forces while maintaining the city’s stability.

The ethnic identity of the city has also evolved since its handover to China. Though many still identify as having a mixed identity, more and more people see themselves as Hong Kongers or Hong Kongers in China, while those who identify as Chinese or Chinese in Hong Kong has dropped since the 1997 handover.

 

Other public opinion surveys indicate that Hong Kong residents are increasingly dissatisfied with the Hong Kong SAR government, and trust in the Hong Kong and Beijing central governments is waning [PDF]. Over the years, all chief executives have been unpopular. Hong Kong’s legislative body, made up of lawmakers both elected by geographical constituencies and selected by functional constituencies (representatives from social, industrial, and commercial sectors), as well as the chief executive’s election committee, disproportionately prioritize business interests and are generally loyal to Beijing. The political scene has traditionally been split, dominated by two major factions: pan-democrats, who call for incremental democratic reforms, and pro-establishment groups, who are, by and large, pro-business supporters of Beijing. Pro-establishment forces have typically been more dominant in Hong Kong politics.  

Pan-democrats overwhelmingly advocate for the gradual implementation of political reform and a pragmatic, measured approach to Beijing. Pan-democrats recognize that Hong Kong cannot force Beijing into reforms that could contradict or undermine Beijing’s central authority; reforms are more likely to be successful when a change in Hong Kong is also beneficial to the mainland. As a result, even Hong Kong’s more progressive political groups are largely more conservative than the student protesters who are demanding full-fledged democracy.

Vocal and politicized youth are at the forefront of Hong Kong’s democracy movement. In the aftermath of the 2014 protests, young activists have formed new political groups and parties embracing a more overtly local, Hong Kong identity. These parties include more radical, anti-Beijing and nativist parties like Youngspiration and Hong Kong Indigenous, as well as the Hong Kong National Party, the first political party to call for formal Hong Kong independence, and Demosisto, a party advocating for greater autonomy and self-determination co-founded by Joshua Wong.

While the mainstream pan-democrats and the newer pro-democracy parties disagree on the best options to move forward, they share one central concern: Hong Kong’s autonomy is being challenged.

Who are the candidates in the 2017 chief executive election?

Three candidates are running for the chief executive election slated for March 26, 2017:

• Carrie Lam – The former chief secretary of the Hong Kong SAR Government (2012–2017) resigned from her senior position and announced her candidacy for chief executive after her boss, Chun-ying Leung, said he would not run for a second term. Lam, a pro-establishment candidate who has pledged to maintain Leung’s “good policies,” received 580 nominations from the 1,200 member election committee and is favored to win.

• John Tsang – The former financial secretary (2007–2017) is running on a campaign slogan of “Trust, Unity, Hope.”  Tsang, who is seen as holding a softer political stance vis-à-vis Lam, struggled to receive nomination support from pro-Beijing electors and ultimately received 165 votes with at least 125 from the pan-democratic camp (a candidate must get 150 nomination votes to stand in the election).

• Woo Kwok-hing – The retired judge served as the vice president of Hong Kong’s second-highest court of appeal (2004–2011) and the chairman of the Electoral Affairs Commission (1993–2006). Woo, who is considered moderate, is running on a platform that advocates for political reform.

What is the role of international actors?

Many experts say there is little that foreign governments can do to influence Hong Kong’s democratization process. After the 2014 protests, the British government urged China to allow the “meaningful advance for democracy” in Hong Kong. In December 2016, Hong Kong’s last colonial governor, Chris Patten, said he believed the city would have democracy sooner rather than later but condemned the argument for independence, stating that fighting for independence dilutes support for democracy. The United States under the Obama administration issued statements backing pro-democracy protesters, but all statements avoided direct criticism of Beijing. Members of the U.S. Congress have called for the revival of annual reports on political reform in Hong Kong, a provision of the 1992 U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act that was suspended in 2000. More recently, Senators Tom Cotton, Marco Rubio, and Ben Cardin revived a bipartisan bill, the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act, which calls for the imposition of sanctions on officials and individuals responsible for suppressing basic freedoms in Hong Kong. Some experts urge for a greater effort by Western democracies to support Hong Kong’s democracy movement and to condemn human rights violations.

In Beijing’s eyes, any interference by outside parties is a violation of Chinese sovereignty. In theory, the United Kingdom could seek recourse for Beijing’s failure to comply with the Sino-British Joint Declaration. However, the declaration provides no specifics on how the chief executive and legislative bodies should be selected. China also selectively recognizes international law, particularly when national sovereignty is involved.

Meanwhile, multinational firms have been largely quiet on the democracy debate beyond appeals for stability. Hong Kong’s business community in particular fears sustained unrest could undermine investor confidence and increase doubts about the city’s ability to carry on as an international financial center.

Additional Resources

This 2017 Al Jazeera video provides an introduction to Hong Kong’s localist factions.

Richard C. Bush’s 2016 book, Hong Kong in the Shadow of China, explores the ongoing struggle between Hong Kong and Beijing.

This Quartz feature explains the importance of Hong Kong to China’s economy.

The Chinese government issued a white paper on the application of the “one country, two systems” policy in Hong Kong in June 2014.

The United States signed the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act in 1992.