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By Richard Haass, Financial Times–

The latest Syrian ceasefire was announced last week by John Kerry, US secretary of state, and Sergei Lavrov, Russia’s foreign minister. This led to hopes that a conflict that has caused hundreds of thousands of deaths and displaced a majority of the population of Syria will finally begin to wind down, or even end. Alas, those hopes are unlikely to be realised.

The basics of the agreement are these. A reduction in violence involving the Russian-backed government and the Sunni rebel groups supported by the US and several neighbouring countries is to come into effect. It will be followed by the shipment of humanitarian supplies into the besieged city of Aleppo, after which joint US and Russian military efforts will commence against Isis and Jabhat al-Nusra, the local al-Qaeda affiliate. Russia is committed to persuading its Syrian partner to stop attacks on Sunni rebel groups in civilian areas, while the US is meant to pressure many of those same rebel groups to reduce their attacks on government positions.

What are the chances that this will work? The Russians might be prepared to embrace a limited ceasefire now that Russian and Iranian support has strengthened the Syrian government and secured its immediate future. The status quo is something they could live with, especially as the principal element of continued military operations would involve US and Russian attacks on Isis and al-Nusra. For his part, Vladimir Putin, the Russian president, will undoubtedly welcome an opportunity to appear as a peacemaker, after his use of military force to advance his aims in Georgia and Ukraine, as well as Syria. Some rebels may need a respite.

In practice, though, events are likely to unfold differently. The Syrian government has a poor record of honouring commitments. And even it is prepared to abide by this truce, not all the rebel groups will go along with it.

Meanwhile, a number of the other actors involved in Syria, including Iran, Hizbollah, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the Kurds, Isis and al-Nusra, have reason to continue doing what they have been doing for some time. Indeed, the Syrian conflict is in fact many conflicts. To be sure, the principal faultline has been that between the Assad government and various Sunni rebel groups but there are others, most notably between the Turks and Syrian Kurds, and between the US and Isis. Turkey is much more concerned with weakening Syrian Kurds, who want their own enclave or state, than it is with undermining either Isis or the Assad government. Meanwhile, Hizbollah and its Iranian backers want to maintain the buffer established along Syria’s border with Lebanon.

The alternative would be to change conditions on the ground. One could imagine an effort to make certain areas safe. It would require creating a humanitarian zone, something that would entail air cover and ground troops from rebel groups, and friendly neighbours.

Such an approach would not end the war, but that is beyond anyone for the foreseeable future. Neither a national ceasefire nor a transition to a post-Assad unity government is on the cards. More realistic would be safeguarding various enclaves to reduce the humanitarian toll. Such a goal may seem too modest but in the Middle East even what is modest can be ambitious.

The writer is president of the Council on Foreign Relations